Imprecise evidence without imprecise credences.
Does rationality require imprecise credences? Many hold that it does: imprecise evidence requires correspondingly imprecise credences. I argue that this is false. The imprecise view faces the same arbitrariness worries that were meant to motivate it in the first place. It faces these worries because...
| Published in: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 177; no. 9; pp. 2735 - 2759 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Sep2020
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=144642703&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 144642703 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2020 vid: 177 iid: 9 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 144642703 10.1007/s11098-019-01336-7 ppf: 2735 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 357KB tig: atl: Imprecise evidence without imprecise credences. aug: au: Carr, Jennifer Rose affil: University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr, #0119, 92093, La Jolla, CA, USA su: Theory of knowledge Confidence Debate Jellyfishes Probability theory Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 1947- sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Confidence Debate Jellyfishes Probability theory Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 1947- keyword: Bayesianism Epistemology Imprecise credences Imprecise probabilities ab: Does rationality require imprecise credences? Many hold that it does: imprecise evidence requires correspondingly imprecise credences. I argue that this is false. The imprecise view faces the same arbitrariness worries that were meant to motivate it in the first place. It faces these worries because it incorporates a certain idealization. But doing away with this idealization effectively collapses the imprecise view into a particular kind of precise view. On this alternative, our attitudes should reflect a kind of normative uncertainty: uncertainty about what to believe. This view refutes the claim that precise credences are inappropriately informative or committal. Some argue that indeterminate evidential support requires imprecise credences; but I argue that indeterminate evidential support instead places indeterminate requirements on credences, and is compatible with the claim that rational credences may always be precise. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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