Epistemic Judgments are Insensitive to Probabilities.
Multiple epistemological programs make use of intuitive judgments pertaining to an individual's ability to gain knowledge from exclusively probabilistic/statistical information. This paper argues that these judgments likely form without deference to such information, instead being a function of the...
| Publicado en: | Metaphilosophy Vol. 51; no. 4; pp. 499 - 522 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=144707360&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 144707360 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00261068 9OM jtl: Metaphilosophy issn: 00261068 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2020 vid: 51 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 144707360 10.1111/meta.12444 ppf: 499 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 109KB tig: atl: Epistemic Judgments are Insensitive to Probabilities. aug: au: Bricker, Adam Michael su: Statistics Probability theory Epistemic logic Respect sug: subj: Statistics Probability theory Epistemic logic Respect keyword: epistemology heuristic decision making lottery paradox representativeness heuristic statistical evidence ab: Multiple epistemological programs make use of intuitive judgments pertaining to an individual's ability to gain knowledge from exclusively probabilistic/statistical information. This paper argues that these judgments likely form without deference to such information, instead being a function of the degree to which having knowledge is representative of an agent. Thus, these judgments fit the pattern of formation via a representativeness heuristic, like that famously described by Kahneman and Tversky to explain similar probabilistic judgments. Given this broad insensitivity to probabilistic/statistical information, it directly follows that these epistemic judgments are insensitive to a given agent's epistemic status. From this, the paper concludes that, breaking with common epistemological practice, we cannot assume that such judgments are reliable. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Metaphilosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Metaphilosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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