Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution.
Modern processors use branch prediction and speculative execution to maximize performance. For example, if the destination of a branch depends on a memory value that is in the process of being read, CPUs will try to guess the destination and attempt to execute ahead. When the memory value finally ar...
| Publicado en: | Communications of the ACM Vol. 63; no. 7; pp. 93 - 102 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , , , , , , , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Association for Computing Machinery
Jul2020
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=144780582&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 144780582 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00010782 ACM jtl: Communications of the ACM issn: 00010782 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2020 vid: 63 iid: 7 pid: 68 pub: Association for Computing Machinery artinfo: ui: 144780582 10.1145/3399742 ppf: 93 ppct: 9 formats: tig: atl: Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution. aug: au: Kocher, Paul Horn, Jann Fogh, Anders Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Daniel Haas, Werner Hamburg, Mike Lipp, Moritz Mangard, Stefan Prescher, Thomas Schwarz, Michael Yarom, Yuval affil: Google Project Zero G DATA Advanced Analytics University of Michigan Graz University of Technology Cyberus Technology Rambus, Cryptography Research Division University of Adelaide and Data61 su: Computer hacking Central processing units Instruction set architecture Just-in-time systems Microprocessors sug: subj: Computer hacking Central processing units Instruction set architecture Just-in-time systems Microprocessors ab: Modern processors use branch prediction and speculative execution to maximize performance. For example, if the destination of a branch depends on a memory value that is in the process of being read, CPUs will try to guess the destination and attempt to execute ahead. When the memory value finally arrives, the CPU either discards or commits the speculative computation. Speculative logic is unfaithful in how it executes, can access the victim's memory and registers, and can perform operations with measurable side effects. Spectre attacks involve inducing a victim to speculatively perform operations that would not occur during correct program execution and which leak the victim's confidential information via a side channel to the adversary. This paper describes practical attacks that combine methodology from side-channel attacks, fault attacks, and return-oriented programming that can read arbitrary memory from the victim's process. More broadly, the paper shows that speculative execution implementations violate the security assumptions underpinning numerous software security mechanisms, such as operating system process separation, containerization, just-in-time (JIT) compilation, and countermeasures to cache timing and side-channel attacks. These attacks represent a serious threat to actual systems because vulnerable speculative execution capabilities are found in microprocessors from Intel, AMD, and ARM that are used in billions of devices. Although makeshift processor-specific countermeasures are possible in some cases, sound solutions will require fixes to processor designs as well as updates to instruction set architectures (ISAs) to give hardware architects and software developers a common understanding as to what computation state CPU implementations are (and are not) permitted to leak. pubtype: Periodical doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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