Simone Weil: The Ethics of Affliction and the Aesthetics of Attention.
For Simone Weil the invocation of 'rights' to address extreme human suffering–what she calls 'affliction'–is 'ludicrously inadequate'. Rights, Weil argues, invite a response, whereas what the afflicted require is not dialogue but simply to be heard. For Weil, hearing the 'cry' of the afflicted is th...
| Publicado en: | International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 28; no. 2; pp. 145 - 168 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
May2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=144826708&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 144826708 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09672559 5BE jtl: International Journal of Philosophical Studies issn: 09672559 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2020 vid: 28 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 144826708 10.1080/09672559.2020.1736127 ppf: 145 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.4MB tig: atl: Simone Weil: The Ethics of Affliction and the Aesthetics of Attention. aug: au: Thomas, Christopher affil: Department of History, Politics and Philosophy, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK su: Weil, Simone, 1909-1943 Aesthetics Human rights Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Social justice sug: subj: Weil, Simone, 1909-1943 Aesthetics Human rights Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 Social justice keyword: aesthetics affliction attention Immanuel Kant justice Simone Weil ab: For Simone Weil the invocation of 'rights' to address extreme human suffering–what she calls 'affliction'–is 'ludicrously inadequate'. Rights, Weil argues, invite a response, whereas what the afflicted require is not dialogue but simply to be heard. For Weil, hearing the 'cry' of the afflicted is the basis of all justice. The task of such a hearing is given over to Weil's concept of attention, which demands an ethics of creative silence. This paper will argue that central to Weil's ethics of attention, and thus the way she thinks we should show compassion and act justly, is the Kantian aesthetic concept of disinterestedness. I will argue that whilst Weil is influenced by Kant in multiple ways, it is his aesthetics, rather than his normative moral theory, that is most at play in her own ethical theory of attention. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of International Journal of Philosophical Studies is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: International Journal of Philosophical Studies holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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