Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism.
Can robots have significant moral status? This is an emerging topic of debate among roboticists and ethicists. This paper makes three contributions to this debate. First, it presents a theory—'ethical behaviourism'—which holds that robots can have significant moral status if they are roughly perform...
| Publicado en: | Science & Engineering Ethics Vol. 26; no. 4; pp. 2023 - 2050 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=145047206&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 145047206 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13533452 GNI jtl: Science & Engineering Ethics issn: 13533452 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2020 vid: 26 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 145047206 10.1007/s11948-019-00119-x ppf: 2023 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 797KB tig: atl: Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism. aug: au: Danaher, John affil: School of Law, NUI Galway, University Road, Galway, Ireland su: Robots Circle sug: subj: Robots Circle keyword: Ethical behaviourism Moral standing Moral status Procreative beneficence ab: Can robots have significant moral status? This is an emerging topic of debate among roboticists and ethicists. This paper makes three contributions to this debate. First, it presents a theory—'ethical behaviourism'—which holds that robots can have significant moral status if they are roughly performatively equivalent to other entities that have significant moral status. This theory is then defended from seven objections. Second, taking this theoretical position onboard, it is argued that the performative threshold that robots need to cross in order to be afforded significant moral status may not be that high and that they may soon cross it (if they haven't done so already). Finally, the implications of this for our procreative duties to robots are considered, and it is argued that we may need to take seriously a duty of 'procreative beneficence' towards robots. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Science & Engineering Ethics is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Science & Engineering Ethics holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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