The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects.

In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument...

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Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 85; no. 4; pp. 829 - 841
Autores principales: Goldberg, Sanford, Matheson, Jonathan
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects.
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          Goldberg, Sanford
          Matheson, Jonathan
        affil:
          Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 60201, Evanston, IL, USA
          Department of Philosophy, University of North Florida, 1 UNF Drive, 32224, Jacksonville, FL, USA
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        Reflective learning
        Argument
        Evidence
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          Reflective learning
          Argument
          Evidence
      ab: In this paper we give reasons to think that reflective epistemic subjects cannot possess mere animal knowledge. To do so we bring together literature on defeat and higher-order evidence with literature on the distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. We then defend our argument from a series of possible objections.
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    language: English
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