How to Be a Pluralist in Substance Ontology.

The four principal competing substance ontologies are substratum theory, bundle theory, primitive substance theory, and hylomorphism. Both historically and in the recent literature, most arguments pertaining to these four theories have been developed under the assumption that only one of them can be...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 85; no. 4; pp. 995 - 1023
Autor principal: Dumsday, Travis
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=145137091&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 145137091
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        01650106
        5KZ
      jtl: Erkenntnis
      issn: 01650106
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Aug2020
      vid: 85
      iid: 4
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        145137091
        10.1007/s10670-018-0062-0
      ppf: 995
      ppct: 28
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 482KB
      tig:
        atl: How to Be a Pluralist in Substance Ontology.
      aug:
        au: Dumsday, Travis
        affil: Canada Research Chair in Theology and the Philosophy of Science, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Concordia University of Edmonton, 7128 Ada Blvd., T5B 4E4, Edmonton, AB, Canada
      su:
        Ontology
        Pluralism
        Argument
        Debate
      sug:
        subj:
          Ontology
          Pluralism
          Argument
          Debate
      ab: The four principal competing substance ontologies are substratum theory, bundle theory, primitive substance theory, and hylomorphism. Both historically and in the recent literature, most arguments pertaining to these four theories have been developed under the assumption that only one of them can be true. (E.g., substratum theorists typically think that substrata must be real if substances are real at all, and that the other three theories are impossible.) However there is room in this debate for various forms of pluralism: mild pluralism here refers to the view that while only one of these four theories is true of our world, there is at least one other possible world in which a different substance ontology obtains; moderate pluralism refers to the view that while only one of these four theories is true of our world, there is at least one other possible world in which multiple substance ontologies obtain (e.g., a possible world in which some substances are compounds of substrata and properties and other substances consist solely of compresent properties); and extreme pluralism refers to the view that our own actual world contains substances belonging to different substance ontologies. In this paper I lay out a novel argument for a version of extreme pluralism.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Erkenntnis
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2020
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N