Epistemic Holes and Determinism in Classical General Relativity.
Determinism fails easily if spacetimes with points removed from the spacetime manifold are taken to be physically reasonable representations of a way the world could be according to classical general relativity. I discuss a recently proposed condition for determining which spacetimes have holes—epis...
| Publicado en: | British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Vol. 71; no. 3; pp. 1093 - 1112 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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University of Chicago Press
Sep2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=145239290&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 145239290 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00070882 BPL jtl: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science issn: 00070882 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2020 vid: 71 iid: 3 pid: 415 pub: University of Chicago Press artinfo: ui: 145239290 10.1093/bjps/axz011 ppf: 1093 ppct: 19 formats: tig: atl: Epistemic Holes and Determinism in Classical General Relativity. aug: au: Doboszewski, Juliusz su: General relativity (Physics) Naturopathy Manifolds (Mathematics) sug: subj: General relativity (Physics) Naturopathy Manifolds (Mathematics) ab: Determinism fails easily if spacetimes with points removed from the spacetime manifold are taken to be physically reasonable representations of a way the world could be according to classical general relativity. I discuss a recently proposed condition for determining which spacetimes have holes—epistemic hole freeness—and show that (a) epistemic hole freeness gives the correct verdict in some (but not all) non-globally hyperbolic spacetimes with a closed subset removed, (b) certain spacetimes with genuinely indeterministic features count as having an epistemic hole, which implies that the requirement of epistemic hole freeness enforces a form of determinism, and (c) there is a large class of spacetimes that intuitively are radically indeterministic and unphysical due to containing a hole (of a kind), but are free from epistemic holes. I show that a few natural ways of remedying (c) are not satisfactory. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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