Grading Modal Judgement.
This paper proposes a new model of graded modal judgement. It begins by problematizing the phenomenon: given plausible constraints on the logic of epistemic modality, it is impossible to model graded attitudes toward modal claims as judgements of probability targeting epistemically modal proposition...
| Publicado en: | Mind (0026-4423) Vol. 129; no. 515; pp. 769 - 808 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=145254685&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 145254685 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00264423 MND jtl: Mind (0026-4423) issn: 00264423 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2020 vid: 129 iid: 515 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 145254685 10.1093/mind/fzz028 ppf: 769 ppct: 39 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 301KB tig: atl: Grading Modal Judgement. aug: au: Charlow, Nate su: Epistemics Semantics Cognition Theory of knowledge Debate sug: subj: Epistemics Semantics Cognition Theory of knowledge Debate ab: This paper proposes a new model of graded modal judgement. It begins by problematizing the phenomenon: given plausible constraints on the logic of epistemic modality, it is impossible to model graded attitudes toward modal claims as judgements of probability targeting epistemically modal propositions. This paper considers two alternative models, on which modal operators are non-proposition-forming: (1) Moss (2015) , in which graded attitudes toward modal claims are represented as judgements of probability targeting a 'proxy' proposition, belief in which would underwrite belief in the modal claim; (2) a model on which graded attitudes toward modal claims are represented as judgements of credence taking as their objects (non-propositional) modal representations (rather than proxy propositions). The second model, like Moss's model, is shown to be semantically and mathematically tractable. The second model, however, can be straightforwardly integrated into a plausible model of the role of graded attitudes toward modal claims in cognition and normative epistemology. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Mind Association. item: Mind (0026-4423) holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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