Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt.
Recently, companions in guilt strategies have garnered significant philosophical attention as a response to arguments for moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and that our moral beliefs are thus systematically mistaken. According to Cuneo (The normative web: an argument for mor...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 177; no. 10; pp. 2969 - 2984 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=145269407&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 145269407 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2020 vid: 177 iid: 10 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 145269407 10.1007/s11098-019-01355-4 ppf: 2969 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 270KB tig: atl: Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt. aug: au: Wittwer, Silvan affil: Harvard University, Emerson Hall, 25 Quincy Street, 02138, Cambridge, MA, USA su: Metaphysics Theory Epistemics Realism Philosophy sug: subj: Metaphysics Theory Epistemics Realism Philosophy keyword: Companions in guilt Epistemic reasons Evolutionary debunking Explanatory dispensability Moral error theory ab: Recently, companions in guilt strategies have garnered significant philosophical attention as a response to arguments for moral error theory, the view that there are no moral facts and that our moral beliefs are thus systematically mistaken. According to Cuneo (The normative web: an argument for moral realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), Das (Philos Q 66:152–160, 2016; Australas J Philos 95(1):58–69, 2017), Rowland (J Ethics Soc Philos 7(1):1–24, 2012; Philos Q 66:161–171, 2016) and others, epistemic facts would be just as metaphysically problematic (or 'guilty') as moral facts. But since epistemic error theory is implausible, arguments for moral error theory prove too much and should be rejected. My aim is to argue that the success of this strategy is limited. In particular, the companions in guilt response fails against error-theoretic arguments motivated by concerns about explanatory dispensability, as recently developed by Joyce (The evolution of morality, MIT press, Bradford, 2005) and Olson (Moral error theory: history, critique, defence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014: Ch. 7). To succeed, the response would require a prima facie plausible argument to the effect that epistemic facts are metaphysically dubious because they, too, are explanatorily dispensable. But, as I show, any such argument proves self-effacing: its premise commits us to believing in epistemic facts, while its conclusion forces us to deny their existence. Consequently, companions in guilt strategies don't offer a panacea against arguments for moral error theory. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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