How to stay safe while extending the mind.
According to the extended mind thesis, cognitive processes are not confined to the nervous system but can extend beyond skin and skull to notebooks, iPhones, computers and such. The extended mind thesis is a metaphysical thesis about the material basis of our cognition. As such, whether the thesis i...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 197; no. 9; pp. 4065 - 4082 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=145269424&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 145269424 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2020 vid: 197 iid: 9 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 145269424 10.1007/s11229-018-01920-0 ppf: 4065 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 430KB tig: atl: How to stay safe while extending the mind. aug: au: Hirvelä, Jaakko affil: Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies, University of Helsinki, Unioninkatu 38 PL 24, 00014, Helsinki, Finland su: Theory of knowledge Nervous system Mind & body Virtue epistemology sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Nervous system Mind & body Virtue epistemology keyword: Christoph Kelp Extended mind thesis J. Adam Carter Luck Safety condition ab: According to the extended mind thesis, cognitive processes are not confined to the nervous system but can extend beyond skin and skull to notebooks, iPhones, computers and such. The extended mind thesis is a metaphysical thesis about the material basis of our cognition. As such, whether the thesis is true can have implications for epistemological issues. Carter has recently argued that safety-based theories of knowledge are in tension with the extended mind hypothesis, since the safety condition implies that there is an epistemic difference between subjects who form their beliefs via their biological capacities and between subjects who have extended their cognition. Kelp, on the other hand, has argued that a safety-based theory of knowledge can be correct only if the extended mind thesis is true. While these claims are not logically inconsistent, they do leave the safety theorist in an uncomfortable position. I will argue that safety-based theories of knowledge are not hostage to the truth of the extended mind thesis, and that once the safety condition is properly understood it is not in tension with the extended mind thesis. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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