How numerals support new cognitive capacities.
Mathematical cognition has become an interesting case study for wider theories of cognition. Menary (Open MIND 25(T):1–20, 2015) argues that arithmetical cognition not only shows that internalist theories of cognition are wrong, but that it also shows that the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition is rig...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 197; no. 9; pp. 3779 - 3797 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=145269429&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 145269429 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2020 vid: 197 iid: 9 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 145269429 10.1007/s11229-018-01989-7 ppf: 3779 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 468KB tig: atl: How numerals support new cognitive capacities. aug: au: Buijsman, Stefan affil: Filosofiska Institutionen, Stockholm University, Universitetsvägen 10D, 106 91, Stockholm, Sweden su: Number systems Mathematical ability Numerals Cognition sug: subj: Number systems Mathematical ability Numerals Cognition keyword: Embedded cognition Enculturation Extended cognition Number processing Philosophy of arithmetic ab: Mathematical cognition has become an interesting case study for wider theories of cognition. Menary (Open MIND 25(T):1–20, 2015) argues that arithmetical cognition not only shows that internalist theories of cognition are wrong, but that it also shows that the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition is right. I examine this argument in more detail, to see if arithmetical cognition can support such conclusions. Specifically, I look at how the use of numerals extends our arithmetical abilities from quantity-related innate systems to systems that can deal with exact numbers of arbitrary size. I then argue that the system underlying our grasp of small numbers is an unhelpful case study for Menary; it doesn't support an argument for externalism over internalism. The system for large numbers, on the other hand, clearly displays important interactions between public numeral systems and our cognitive processes. I argue that the large number system supports an argument against internalist theories of arithmetical cognition, but that one cannot conclude that the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition is correct. In other words, the large number case doesn't decide (on the basis of an inference to the best explanation) between the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition and the Hypothesis of EMbedded Cognition. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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