Heuristics and Human Judgment: What We Can Learn About Scientific Discovery from the Study of Engineering Design.

Philosophical analyses of scientific methodology have long understood intuition to be incompatible with a rule based reasoning that is often considered necessary for a rational scientific method. This paper seeks to challenge this contention by highlighting the indispensable role that intuition play...

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Publicado en:Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 39; no. 4; pp. 987 - 996
Autor principal: Young, Mark Thomas
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Sep2020
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Heuristics and Human Judgment: What We Can Learn About Scientific Discovery from the Study of Engineering Design.
      aug:
        au: Young, Mark Thomas
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen, Postboks 7805, Sydnesplassen 12-13, 5020, Bergen, Norway
      su:
        Engineering design
        Scientific discoveries
        Heuristic
        Scientific method
        Model-based reasoning
        Philosophical analysis
        Intuition
      sug:
        subj:
          Engineering design
          Scientific discoveries
          Heuristic
          Scientific method
          Model-based reasoning
          Philosophical analysis
          Intuition
      keyword:
        Heuristics
        Judgment
        Scientific discovery
        Scientific discovery machines
        Skill
      ab: Philosophical analyses of scientific methodology have long understood intuition to be incompatible with a rule based reasoning that is often considered necessary for a rational scientific method. This paper seeks to challenge this contention by highlighting the indispensable role that intuition plays in the application of methodologies for scientific discovery. In particular, it seeks to outline a positive role for intuition and personal judgment in scientific discovery by exploring a comparison between the use of heuristic reasoning in scientific practice and engineering design. While these discussions share many features, it will also be shown that the successful use of heuristics in engineering design is often considered to depend on a crucial factor that is markedly absent from accounts of the use of heuristics in scientific discovery; experienced judgment. In the final sections of this paper, I will compare attitudes to the role of computer analysis in scientific and engineering practices, with the aim of showing how the limitations of scientific discovery machines reveal the need for including intuition in philosophical accounts of heuristic reasoning in scientific discovery.
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    language: English
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