The demand‐boost theory of exclusive dealing.
This article unifies various approaches to the analysis of exclusive dealing that so far have been regarded as distinct. The common element of these approaches is that firms depart from efficient pricing, raising marginal prices above marginal costs. We show that with distorted prices, exclusive dea...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 51; no. 3; pp. 713 - 739 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2020
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=145532464&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 145532464 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2020 vid: 51 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 145532464 10.1111/1756-2171.12338 ppf: 713 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 622KB tig: atl: The demand‐boost theory of exclusive dealing. aug: au: Calzolari, Giacomo Denicolò, Vincenzo Zanchettin, Piercarlo affil: European University Institute CEPR, Center for Economic and Policy Research University of Bologna CEPR University of Leicester su: Price increases Marginal pricing Antitrust law Exclusive contracts Direct costing sug: subj: Price increases Marginal pricing Antitrust law Exclusive contracts Direct costing ab: This article unifies various approaches to the analysis of exclusive dealing that so far have been regarded as distinct. The common element of these approaches is that firms depart from efficient pricing, raising marginal prices above marginal costs. We show that with distorted prices, exclusive dealing can be directly profitable and anticompetitive provided that the dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over rivals. The dominant firm gains directly, rather than in the future, or in adjacent markets, thanks to the boost in demand it enjoys when buyers sign exclusive contracts. We discuss the implication of the theory for antitrust policy. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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