Estimation in English auctions with unobserved heterogeneity.

We propose a framework for identification and estimation of a private values model with unobserved heterogeneity from bid data in English auctions, using variation in the number of bidders across auctions, and extend the framework to settings where the number of bidders is not cleanly observed in ea...

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Publicado en:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 51; no. 3; pp. 868 - 905
Autores principales: Hernández, Cristián, Quint, Daniel, Turansick, Christopher
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Sep2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Estimation in English auctions with unobserved heterogeneity.
      aug:
        au:
          Hernández, Cristián
          Quint, Daniel
          Turansick, Christopher
        affil:
          NERA Economic Consulting
          University of Wisconsin‐Madison
          Georgetown University
      su:
        Heterogeneity
        Auctions
        Bidders
      sug:
        subj:
          Heterogeneity
          Auctions
          Bidders
      ab: We propose a framework for identification and estimation of a private values model with unobserved heterogeneity from bid data in English auctions, using variation in the number of bidders across auctions, and extend the framework to settings where the number of bidders is not cleanly observed in each auction. We illustrate our method on data from eBay Motors auctions. We find that unobserved heterogeneity is important, accounting for two thirds of price variation after controlling for observables, and that welfare measures would be dramatically misestimated if unobserved heterogeneity were ignored.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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