From Knowability to Conjecturability.
Arguments from knowability have largely been concerned with cases for and against realism, or truth as an epistemic vs. non-epistemic concept. This article proposes bringing Peirce's pragmaticism, called here 'action-first' epistemology, to bear on the issue. It is shown that a notion weaker than kn...
| Publicado en: | Contemporary Pragmatism Vol. 17; no. 2/3; pp. 205 - 228 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Brill Academic Publishers
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=145644084&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 145644084 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15723429 8WEE jtl: Contemporary Pragmatism issn: 15723429 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2020 vid: 17 iid: 2/3 pid: 639 pub: Brill Academic Publishers artinfo: ui: 145644084 10.1163/18758185-01701160 ppf: 205 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 255KB tig: atl: From Knowability to Conjecturability. aug: au: Chiffi, Daniele Pietarinen, Ahti-Veikko affil: DAStU, Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy HSE University Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia su: Theory of knowledge Political theology Civilization Social institutions Democracy sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Political theology Civilization Social institutions Democracy keyword: conjecturability knowability modality Peirce pragmaticism scientific progress values ab: Arguments from knowability have largely been concerned with cases for and against realism, or truth as an epistemic vs. non-epistemic concept. This article proposes bringing Peirce's pragmaticism, called here 'action-first' epistemology, to bear on the issue. It is shown that a notion weaker than knowability, namely conjecturability, is epistemologically a better-suited notion to describe an essential component of scientific inquiry. Moreover, unlike knowability, conjecturability does not suffer from paradoxes. Given fundamental uncertainty that permeates inquiry, knowability and what Peirce took to be 'perfect knowledge' lose their appeal in epistemology of science. From the points of view of the logic for pragmatics and the modal translations given in this article, conjecturability and pragmaticism provide an enriched epistemology for scientific practices that can accommodate both epistemic and non-epistemic values. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Contemporary Pragmatism is the property of Brill Academic Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Contemporary Pragmatism holder: Brill Academic Publishers dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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