An argument against global no miracles arguments.
Howson famously argues that the no-miracles argument, stating that the success of science indicates the approximate truth of scientific theories, is a base rate fallacy: it neglects the possibility of an overall low rate of true scientific theories. Recently a number of authors has suggested that th...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 197; no. 10; pp. 4341 - 4364 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Oct2020
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=145740198&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 145740198 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2020 vid: 197 iid: 10 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 145740198 10.1007/s11229-018-01925-9 ppf: 4341 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 625KB tig: atl: An argument against global no miracles arguments. aug: au: Boge, Florian J. affil: Interdisciplinary Centre for Science and Technology Studies (IZWT), Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Gaußstr. 20, room S.11.19, 42119, Wuppertal, Germany Institute for Theoretical Particle Physics and Cosmology, RWTH Aachen University, Otto-Blumenthal-Straße, 52074, Aachen, Germany su: Argument Miracles Possibility Truth Probability theory Probabilistic number theory sug: subj: Argument Miracles Possibility Truth Probability theory Probabilistic number theory keyword: Base rate fallacy Inductive skepticism No miracles argument Scientific realism ab: Howson famously argues that the no-miracles argument, stating that the success of science indicates the approximate truth of scientific theories, is a base rate fallacy: it neglects the possibility of an overall low rate of true scientific theories. Recently a number of authors has suggested that the corresponding probabilistic reconstruction is unjust, as it concerns only the success of one isolated theory. Dawid and Hartmann, in particular, suggest to use the frequency of success in some field of research R to infer a probability of truth for a new theory from R . I here shed doubts on the justification of this and similar moves and suggest a way to directly bound the probability of truth. As I will demonstrate, my bound can become incompatible with the assumption specific testing and Dawid and Hartmann's estimate for success. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|