Bargaining power in apartment sales in Corsica: A latent class approach.
This paper extends the bargaining model of Harding et al. (Harding J, Rosenthal S and Sirmans CF (2003) Estimating bargaining power in the market for existing homes, Review of Economics and Statistics 85: 178–188), to a latent class framework. This allows for differences in market power in thin and...
| Publicado en: | Urban Studies (Sage Publications, Ltd.) Vol. 57; no. 13; pp. 2754 - 2773 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Sage Publications, Ltd.
Oct2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=145751214&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 145751214 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00420980 54XY jtl: Urban Studies (Sage Publications, Ltd.) issn: 00420980 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2020 vid: 57 iid: 13 pid: 2171 pub: Sage Publications, Ltd. artinfo: ui: 145751214 10.1177/0042098019886738 ppf: 2754 ppct: 19 formats: tig: atl: Bargaining power in apartment sales in Corsica: A latent class approach. aug: au: Caudill, Steven Detotto, Claudio Prunetti, Dominique affil: Florida Atlantic University, USA Universite de Corse Pascal Paoli, France su: Corsica (France) Negotiation Housing market Apartments Home sales Latent class analysis (Statistics) Market power sug: subj: Negotiation Housing market Corsica (France) Apartments Home sales Latent class analysis (Statistics) Market power keyword: 享乐回归 潜在阶层 议价能力 bargaining power hedonic regression latent class 享乐回归 潜在阶层 议价能力 bargaining power hedonic regression latent class ab: This paper extends the bargaining model of Harding et al. (Harding J, Rosenthal S and Sirmans CF (2003) Estimating bargaining power in the market for existing homes, Review of Economics and Statistics 85: 178–188), to a latent class framework. This allows for differences in market power in thin and segmented markets. We estimate a latent class model using data on apartment sales in Corsica over the period 2006 to 2016. Our results indicate that the Corsican housing market has two distinct segments or regimes and that bargaining power of buyers and sellers is not the same in these two segments. In particular, we find that local French residents have strong bargaining power in Regime 1 but non-French residents have weak bargaining power. Regime 2 is characterised by strong bargaining power for local French, Corsican French and non-French participants. Based on auxiliary regressions and a comparison of weighted means associated with each regime, we conclude that compared with Regime 2, the apartments associated with the first regime are more spacious, less likely to be new, more likely to have a garden and typically have longer travel times to local amenities such as doctors, pharmacies and the downtown area. From this we conclude that apartments associated with Regime 1 are more likely to be rural and at a greater distance from the coast. Distance from a city is likely to present an informational disadvantage to non-French residents, who may already face language and legal obstacles. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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