From Implausible Artificial Neurons to Idealized Cognitive Models: Rebooting Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence.

There is a vast literature within philosophy of mind that focuses on artificial intelligence but hardly mentions methodological questions. There is also a growing body of work in philosophy of science about modeling methodology that hardly mentions examples from cognitive science. Here these discuss...

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Published in:Philosophy of Science Vol. 87; no. 4; pp. 590 - 612
Main Author: Stinson, Catherine
Format: Article
Published: Cambridge University Press Oct2020
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: From Implausible Artificial Neurons to Idealized Cognitive Models: Rebooting Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence.
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        au: Stinson, Catherine
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        Artificial intelligence
        Philosophical literature
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        Scientific literature
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          Artificial intelligence
          Philosophical literature
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          Scientific literature
      ab: There is a vast literature within philosophy of mind that focuses on artificial intelligence but hardly mentions methodological questions. There is also a growing body of work in philosophy of science about modeling methodology that hardly mentions examples from cognitive science. Here these discussions are connected. Insights developed in the philosophy of science literature about the importance of idealization provide a way of understanding the neural implausibility of connectionist networks. Insights from neurocognitive science illuminate how relevant similarities between models and targets are picked out, how modeling inferences are justified, and the metaphysical status of models.
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