A Framework for Pragmatic Reliability.

I propose a framework for pragmatic reliability in-the-limit criteria, extending the epistemic reliability framework. I identify some common scientific contexts that complicate the application or interpretation of epistemic reliability criteria, drawing heavily from economics for illustrative exampl...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 87; no. 4; pp. 704 - 727
Autor principal: Davis, Isaac
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Oct2020
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      ab: I propose a framework for pragmatic reliability in-the-limit criteria, extending the epistemic reliability framework. I identify some common scientific contexts that complicate the application or interpretation of epistemic reliability criteria, drawing heavily from economics for illustrative examples. I then propose an extension of the standard framework, where inquiry is constrained by both epistemic and nonepistemic factors. This provides analogous notions of pragmatic underdetermination and pragmatic reliability with respect to a particular goal, as well as a principled method for extracting solvable problems from unsolvable ones.
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