PAC Learning and Occam's Razor: Probably Approximately Incorrect.
Computer scientists have provided a distinct justification of Occam's Razor. Using the probably approximately correct framework, they provide a theorem that they claim demonstrates that we should favor simpler hypotheses. The argument relies on a philosophical interpretation of the theorem. I argue...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 87; no. 4; pp. 685 - 704 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
Oct2020
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=145957771&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 145957771 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2020 vid: 87 iid: 4 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 145957771 10.1086/709786 ppf: 685 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 525KB tig: atl: PAC Learning and Occam's Razor: Probably Approximately Incorrect. aug: au: Herrmann, Daniel A. su: Razors Computer scientists sug: subj: Razors Computer scientists ab: Computer scientists have provided a distinct justification of Occam's Razor. Using the probably approximately correct framework, they provide a theorem that they claim demonstrates that we should favor simpler hypotheses. The argument relies on a philosophical interpretation of the theorem. I argue that the standard interpretation of the result in the literature is misguided and that a better reading does not, in fact, support Occam's Razor at all. To this end, I state and prove a very similar theorem that, if interpreted the same way, would justify the contradictory Anti-Occam's Razor—the principle that we should favor more complex hypotheses. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|