The Price of Twin Earth.

Liberals about perceptual contents claim that perceptual experiences can represent kinds and specific, familiar individuals as such; they also claim that the representation of an individual or kind as such by a perceptual experience will be reflected in the phenomenal character of that experience. C...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 70; no. 281; pp. 689 - 711
Autor principal: Ashby, Brandon James
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Oxford University Press / USA Oct2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The Price of Twin Earth.
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        au: Ashby, Brandon James
        affil: University of Arizona , USA
      su:
        Liberals
        Conservatives
        Liberalism
        Conservatism
        Externalism (Philosophy of mind)
      sug:
        subj:
          Liberals
          Conservatives
          Liberalism
          Conservatism
          Externalism (Philosophy of mind)
      keyword:
        conservativism
        content externalism
        content internalism
        liberalism
        perceptual content
        phenomenal character
      ab: Liberals about perceptual contents claim that perceptual experiences can represent kinds and specific, familiar individuals as such; they also claim that the representation of an individual or kind as such by a perceptual experience will be reflected in the phenomenal character of that experience. Conservatives always deny the latter and sometimes also the former claim. I argue that neither liberals nor conservatives have adequately appreciated how the content internalism/externalism debate bears on their views. I show that perceptual content internalism entails conservativism when conjoined with one other, extremely plausible premise. Hence, liberals are committed to perceptual contents externalism, yet they have failed to fully address the consequences that this has for their view. Moreover, the argument is easily adapted to perceptual experiences of Twin Earthable properties, like colour and shape. I use this last result to show why existing conservative arguments that appeal to Twin Earth plausibly overgeneralize.
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    language: English
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