Preferential Trade Agreements, Democracy, and the Risk of Coups d'état.
Objectives: We seek to investigate the impact of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on coups d'état. We argue that signing PTAs lowers the risk of coups because it acts as a credible commitment of signatory countries to pursuing long‐term economic benefits, which further reduces potential challeng...
| Publicado en: | Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 101; no. 5; pp. 1834 - 1850 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=146139727&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 146139727 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384941 SSQ jtl: Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 00384941 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2020 vid: 101 iid: 5 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 146139727 10.1111/ssqu.12848 ppf: 1834 ppct: 16 formats: tig: atl: Preferential Trade Agreements, Democracy, and the Risk of Coups d'état. aug: au: Wu, Wen‐Chin Ye, Fangjin affil: Academia Sinica Shanghai University of Finance and Economics su: Class differences Intergenerational mobility Sociodemographic factors Political trust (in government) United States politics & government sug: subj: Class differences Intergenerational mobility Sociodemographic factors Political trust (in government) United States politics & government ab: Objectives: We seek to investigate the impact of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on coups d'état. We argue that signing PTAs lowers the risk of coups because it acts as a credible commitment of signatory countries to pursuing long‐term economic benefits, which further reduces potential challengers' incentives to initiate coups. In addition, the effect of PTAs is larger in democracies because democratic signatories are perceived to be more credible in upholding treaty commitments than their authoritarian counterparts. Methods: We employ binary time‐series cross‐sectional (BTSCS) models to examine a sample of 154 countries between 1960 and 2012. Results: We find that signing PTAs reduces risks of coups, especially in countries with higher levels of democratic development. Conclusions: Our study sheds light on how PTAs can prolong leader survival through reducing the likelihood of coups and contributes to emerging studies on the consequences of signing PTAs in the age of economic globalization. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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