Generating Support for a Hypothetical War: Presidential Cues and Justifications.

Objective: Support for wars that involve the United States typically divides by party identification among American voters, leading many scholars to believe that voters need only a partisan cue to go along with war. However, presidents do not endorse war in isolation; instead, they justify it with a...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 101; no. 5; pp. 1761 - 1773
Autor principal: Gooch, Andrew
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Sep2020
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:Objective: Support for wars that involve the United States typically divides by party identification among American voters, leading many scholars to believe that voters need only a partisan cue to go along with war. However, presidents do not endorse war in isolation; instead, they justify it with a variety of reasons ranging from minimal to extensive. Causally identifying these factors—partisan cues and justifications—can be challenging because (1) both occur simultaneously and (2) measured opinion on war usually occurs after the public has been exposed to both. Method: This study leverages experimental evidence that randomizes presidential cues (an actual sitting president) and justifications about a hypothetical (and unnecessary) war in which elites have not staked out positions. Results: Results show that a presidential endorsement alone does not generate support for a hypothetical war, but the inclusion of a justification, even one that is minimal, can increase support for war and improve presidential approval. Overall support still remains low for a hypothetical war and is concentrated among in‐partisans. Conclusion: These results imply that a segment of the American public will go along with war, but the reach is limited to their own party.