Fully Autonomous AI.
In the fields of artificial intelligence and robotics, the term "autonomy" is generally used to mean the capacity of an artificial agent to operate independently of human guidance. It is thereby assumed that the agent has a fixed goal or "utility function" with respect to which the appropriateness o...
| Publicado en: | Science & Engineering Ethics Vol. 26; no. 5; pp. 2473 - 2486 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=146390939&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 146390939 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13533452 GNI jtl: Science & Engineering Ethics issn: 13533452 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2020 vid: 26 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 146390939 10.1007/s11948-020-00243-z ppf: 2473 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 583KB tig: atl: Fully Autonomous AI. aug: au: Totschnig, Wolfhart affil: Universidad Diego Portales, Av. Ejército 260, Santiago, Chile su: Artificial intelligence Utility functions sug: subj: Artificial intelligence Utility functions keyword: Autonomy Goals Normativity ab: In the fields of artificial intelligence and robotics, the term "autonomy" is generally used to mean the capacity of an artificial agent to operate independently of human guidance. It is thereby assumed that the agent has a fixed goal or "utility function" with respect to which the appropriateness of its actions will be evaluated. From a philosophical perspective, this notion of autonomy seems oddly weak. For, in philosophy, the term is generally used to refer to a stronger capacity, namely the capacity to "give oneself the law," to decide by oneself what one's goal or principle of action will be. The predominant view in the literature on the long-term prospects and risks of artificial intelligence is that an artificial agent cannot exhibit such autonomy because it cannot rationally change its own final goal, since changing the final goal is counterproductive with respect to that goal and hence undesirable. The aim of this paper is to challenge this view by showing that it is based on questionable assumptions about the nature of goals and values. I argue that a general AI may very well come to modify its final goal in the course of developing its understanding of the world. This has important implications for how we are to assess the long-term prospects and risks of artificial intelligence. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Science & Engineering Ethics is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Science & Engineering Ethics holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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