Argumentation, Adversariality, and Social Norms.

Janice Moulton's "The Adversary Method: A Philosophical Paradigm" articulated several criticisms of the popular idea of philosophy as adversarial debate. Moulton criticizes it on epistemic grounds, arguing that philosophy's overreliance on adversarial debate is to the detriment of its goals. Some, n...

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Publicado en:Metaphilosophy Vol. 51; no. 5; pp. 747 - 766
Autor principal: Yap, Audrey
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Oct2020
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Argumentation, Adversariality, and Social Norms.
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        Social norms
        Debate
        Idea (Philosophy)
        Philosophy of language
        Group identity
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          Social norms
          Debate
          Idea (Philosophy)
          Philosophy of language
          Group identity
      keyword:
        adversary method
        argumentation
        gender
        race
        stereotypes
      ab: Janice Moulton's "The Adversary Method: A Philosophical Paradigm" articulated several criticisms of the popular idea of philosophy as adversarial debate. Moulton criticizes it on epistemic grounds, arguing that philosophy's overreliance on adversarial debate is to the detriment of its goals. Some, notably Trudy Govier, have argued in favor of at least a minimal adversariality, governed by norms of respectful argumentation. This paper suggests that Govier's faith in these norms is misplaced, because it neglects the social circumstances of the arguers. While some authors have argued that politeness and aggression apply differently to those of different genders, this paper extends that analysis to social identities other than gender. In fact, given certain assumptions about the philosophy of language, engagement in polite adversarial debate may not even be possible for people occupying certain social locations.
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