Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence?
Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way thin...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Issues Vol. 30; no. 1; pp. 132 - 148 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=146497371&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 146497371 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15336077 1731 jtl: Philosophical Issues issn: 15336077 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2020 vid: 30 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 146497371 10.1111/phis.12176 ppf: 132 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 442KB tig: atl: Do looks constitute our perceptual evidence? aug: au: Ghijsen, Harmen affil: Radboud University su: Evidence Philosophers Dogmatism Identification Pressure Evidentialism Epistemics sug: subj: Evidence Philosophers Dogmatism Identification Pressure Evidentialism Epistemics keyword: amodal completion dogmatism looks view multimodal identification perceptual evidence perceptual justification subpersonal processes ab: Many philosophers take experience to be an essential aspect of perceptual justification. I argue against a specific variety of such an experientialist view, namely, the Looks View of perceptual justification, according to which our visual beliefs are mediately justified by beliefs about the way things look. I describe three types of cases that put pressure on the idea that perceptual justification is always related to looks‐related reasons: unsophisticated cognizers, multimodal identification, and amodal completion. I then provide a tentative diagnosis of what goes wrong in the Looks View: it ascribes a specific epistemic role to beliefs about looks that is actually fulfilled by subpersonal perceptual processes. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophical Issues is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophical Issues holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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