Friedman on suspended judgment.
In a recent series of papers, Jane Friedman argues that suspended judgment is a sui generis first-order attitude, with a question (rather than a proposition) as its content. In this paper, I offer a critique of Friedman's project. I begin by responding to her arguments against reductive higher-order...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 197; no. 11; pp. 5009 - 5027 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Nov2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=146788964&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 146788964 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2020 vid: 197 iid: 11 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 146788964 10.1007/s11229-018-01957-1 ppf: 5009 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 439KB tig: atl: Friedman on suspended judgment. aug: au: Masny, Michal affil: Philosophy Department, Princeton University, 08544, Princeton, NJ, USA su: Attitude (Psychology) Argument Agnosticism Matter sug: subj: Attitude (Psychology) Argument Agnosticism Matter keyword: Belief Friedman Inquiry Interrogative attitude Suspended judgment Suspension of judgment ab: In a recent series of papers, Jane Friedman argues that suspended judgment is a sui generis first-order attitude, with a question (rather than a proposition) as its content. In this paper, I offer a critique of Friedman's project. I begin by responding to her arguments against reductive higher-order propositional accounts of suspended judgment, and thus undercut the negative case for her own view. Further, I raise worries about the details of her positive account, and in particular about her claim that one suspends judgment about some matter if and only if one inquires into this matter. Subsequently, I use conclusions drawn from the preceding discussion to offer a tentative account: S suspends judgment about p iff (i) S believes that she neither believes nor disbelieves that p, (ii) S neither believes nor disbelieves that p, and (iii) S intends to judge that p or not-p. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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