Varieties of Cognitive Integration.

Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent's cognitive architecture are m...

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Published in:Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 54; no. 4; pp. 867 - 891
Main Authors: Carter, J. Adam, Kallestrup, Jesper
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Dec2020
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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          Carter, J. Adam
          Kallestrup, Jesper
        affil:
          University of Glasgow
          University of Edinburgh
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        Cognition
        Explosions
        Geographic boundaries
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        subj:
          Cognition
          Explosions
          Geographic boundaries
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      ab: Extended cognition theorists argue that cognitive processes constitutively depend on resources that are neither organically composed, nor located inside the bodily boundaries of the agent, provided certain conditions on the integration of those processes into the agent's cognitive architecture are met. Epistemologists, however, worry that in so far as such cognitively integrated processes are epistemically relevant, agents could thus come to enjoy an untoward explosion of knowledge. This paper develops and defends an approach to cognitive integration—cluster‐model functionalism—which finds application in both domains of inquiry, and which meets the challenge posed by putative cases of cognitive or epistemic bloat.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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