| Sumario: | As we've indicated, cognitive practices have various social elements and are cultivated by social learning: they are social practices.[18] With any cognitive practice, it is possible for participants to engage in that practice in a more or less serious and competent way. Still, we do think it highly plausible to regard conditions (v.a) and (vi.a) as separately necessary conditions for the trustworthiness of the outputs of a cognitive practice.[22] That a practice generates massive and systemic internal or external inconsistencies is the classic way to show that (in our terminology) the outputs of a cognitive practice are untrustworthy. Consequently, although the Trustworthiness Criterion allows that the outputs of the religious practice may be on better footing than those of the astrological practice, at a minimum, the criterion implies a serious downgrade in the trustworthiness of the outputs of the religious practice relative to those of (say) the perceptual practice. As we have noted, these five methods for critically evaluating the outputs of the moral intuition practice are not unique to this practice; they have close counterparts in many other cognitive practices.[33] That said, we recognize the existence of some important differences between the moral intuition practice and other cognitive practices. To fix attention, consider the wide range of cognitive practices in working order that involve familiar, widely respected methods for prompting and evaluating its outputs - for example, in addition to the perceptual practice, the mnemonic practice, and the introspective practice, there are those cognitive practices associated with the disciplines of logic, mathematics, medicine, electrical engineering, geology, botany, horticulture, oceanography, immunology, metallurgy, chemistry, psychology, and astronomy.
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