Objects or Others? Epistemic Agency and the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice.

This paper re-examines the debate between those who, with Miranda Fricker, diagnose the primary, non-contingent harm of testimonial injustice as a kind of epistemic objectification and those who contend it is better thought of as a kind of epistemic othering. Defenders of the othering account of the...

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Publicado en:	Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 23; no. 5; pp. 831 - 846
Autor principal:	McGlynn, Aidan
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Springer Nature 2020
Materias:	Cluster analysis (Statistics) Derivatization Autonomy & independence movements Interpersonal conflict Pohlhaus, Gaile
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost