Metaepistemic Injustice and Intellectual Disability: a Pluralist Account of Epistemic Agency.
The literature on epistemic injustice currently displays a logocentric or propositional bias that excludes people with intellectual disabilities from the scope of epistemic agency and the demands of epistemic justice. This paper develops an account of epistemic agency and injustice that is inclusive...
| Publicado en: | Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 23; no. 5; pp. 755 - 777 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=147180248&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 147180248 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13862820 OEY jtl: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice issn: 13862820 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2020 vid: 23 iid: 5 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 147180248 10.1007/s10677-020-10120-0 ppf: 755 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 512KB tig: atl: Metaepistemic Injustice and Intellectual Disability: a Pluralist Account of Epistemic Agency. aug: au: Catala, Amandine affil: Department of Philosophy, Université du Québec à Montréal, CP 8888, Succ. Centre-Ville, Montreal, H3C 3P8, Quebec, Canada su: Epistemics Racism Religious groups Methodology Pluralism sug: subj: Epistemics Racism Religious groups Methodology Pluralism keyword: Epistemic (in)justice Epistemic agency Intellectual disability Logocentrism Metaepistemic injustice Non-propositional knowledge Philosophical methodology ab: The literature on epistemic injustice currently displays a logocentric or propositional bias that excludes people with intellectual disabilities from the scope of epistemic agency and the demands of epistemic justice. This paper develops an account of epistemic agency and injustice that is inclusive of both people with and people without intellectual disabilities. I begin by specifying the hitherto undertheorized notion of epistemic agency. I develop a broader, pluralist account of epistemic agency, which relies on a conception of knowledge that accounts not only for propositional knowing, but also for other types of knowing that have been largely neglected in debates on epistemic injustice and agency. Based on this pluralist account of epistemic agency, I then show that people with intellectual disabilities qualify as epistemic agents and therefore as subjects of epistemic justice. Finally, I argue that this pluralist account of epistemic agency pushes us to revisit the current conception of epistemic injustice and to expand its taxonomy in two important ways. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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