On Being Bound to Linguistic Norms. Reply to Reinikainen and Kaluziński.
The question whether a constitutive linguistic norm can be prescriptive is central to the debate on the normativity of meaning. Recently, the author has attempted to defend an affirmative answer, pointing to how speakers sporadically invoke constitutive linguistic norms in the service of linguistic...
| Publicado en: | International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 28; no. 4; pp. 527 - 541 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Oct2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=147248312&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 147248312 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09672559 5BE jtl: International Journal of Philosophical Studies issn: 09672559 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2020 vid: 28 iid: 4 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 147248312 10.1080/09672559.2020.1782561 ppf: 527 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 299KB tig: atl: On Being Bound to Linguistic Norms. Reply to Reinikainen and Kaluziński. aug: au: Kiesselbach, Matthias su: Semantics Norm (Philosophy) Philosophical analysis Linguistic analysis Comparative grammar Comparative linguistics sug: subj: Semantics Norm (Philosophy) Philosophical analysis Linguistic analysis Comparative grammar Comparative linguistics keyword: humeanism linguistic calibration meaning Normativity ab: The question whether a constitutive linguistic norm can be prescriptive is central to the debate on the normativity of meaning. Recently, the author has attempted to defend an affirmative answer, pointing to how speakers sporadically invoke constitutive linguistic norms in the service of linguistic calibration. Such invocations are clearly prescriptive. However, they are only appropriate if the invoked norms are applicable to the addressed speaker. But that can only be the case if the speaker herself generally accepts them. This qualification has led critics to argue that if an addressed speaker's acceptance is a necessary condition for legitimate prescriptions (and reproach for failure to adhere to them), then the account becomes unable to underwrite actual normativity. Moreover, critics argue, a danger of vicious circularity arises from the calibration account. This paper shows that once a vantage point within the calibration practice is accepted, the criticisms lose their force. It then explores why a theorist might reject such a perspective and suggests, as a plausible candidate, implicit Humean assumptions about the proper explanation of (linguistic) action. The paper ends by sketching a way forward for the debate on the normativity of meaning in light of this diagnosis. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of International Journal of Philosophical Studies is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: International Journal of Philosophical Studies holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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