KRITIKA INTUICIONISMU A HUEMERŮV POKUS O JEHO REVIZI.
Intuitionism had been one of the most prominent ethical approaches over two hundred years, especially on the British Isles. In the first third of the 20th century it started losing its power; however, in the last few years several philosophers have been trying to renew this approach, which has made...
| Publicado en: | Filozofia Vol. 75; no. 9; pp. 776 - 793 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Filozofia
2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=147292869&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 147292869 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0046385X 1VQE jtl: Filozofia issn: 0046385X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2020 vid: 75 iid: 9 pid: 55711 pub: Filozofia artinfo: ui: 147292869 10.31577/filozofia.2020.75.9.4 ppf: 776 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.8MB tig: atl: KRITIKA INTUICIONISMU A HUEMERŮV POKUS O JEHO REVIZI. aug: au: CHUDÁRKOVÁ, PETRA affil: Univerzita Palackého v Olomouci, Filozofická fakulta, Katedra filozofie, Olomouc, ČR su: Metaethics Year Intuition Philosophers British Isles sug: subj: British Isles Metaethics Year Intuition Philosophers keyword: Coherentism Descriptive ethics Intuitionism Intuitions Moral epistemology Reflective equilibrium Scepticism Coherentism Descriptive ethics Intuitionism Intuitions Metaethics Moral epistemology Reflective equilibrium Scepticism ab: Intuitionism had been one of the most prominent ethical approaches over two hundred years, especially on the British Isles. In the first third of the 20th century it started losing its power; however, in the last few years several philosophers have been trying to renew this approach, which has made it one of the most discussed topics of contemporary metaethics. Intuitionism is a foundationalist approach which regards basic moral beliefs, i.e., intuitions, as self-evident. Nonetheless, modern intuitionists have to cope with empirical evidence which shows that intuitions are not as reliable a source of moral knowledge as would be necessary in this case. The aim of the paper is to present and discuss contemporary critique of intuitionism. First, I introduce intuitionism and its basic assumptions, both ontological and epistemological. Second, I focus on the criticism itself, especially on its empirical aspects concerning the role and the reliability of intuitions. As some of the proponents of intuitionism try to react to these objections and create a less flawed version of this approach, in the third part, I describe one of these attempts, i.e., Michael Huemer's revisionary intuitionism. Finally, I try to explain why intuitionism -- despite these efforts -- remains a problematic approach and why ethics might be better off without it. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: Czech refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Filozofia is the property of Filozofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Filozofia holder: Filozofia dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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