Backlash and Judicial Restraint: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights.
How does backlash from consolidated democracies affect the behavior of liberal international institutions? We argue that liberal international institutions have incentives to appease their democratic critics. Liberal institutions rely on democratic support for their continued effectiveness and can a...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 64; no. 4; pp. 770 - 785 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Dec2020
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=147458162&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 147458162 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00208833 ISQ jtl: International Studies Quarterly issn: 00208833 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2020 vid: 64 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 147458162 10.1093/isq/sqaa047 ppf: 770 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 147458162 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 147458162 tig: atl: Backlash and Judicial Restraint: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights. aug: au: Stiansen, Øyvind Voeten, Erik affil: PluriCourts, University of Oslo PluriCourts, University of Oslo and Georgetown University su: European Court of Human Rights Liberalism Democracy Judicial restraint International organization Judicial reform sug: subj: Liberalism Democracy European Court of Human Rights Judicial restraint International organization Judicial reform ab: How does backlash from consolidated democracies affect the behavior of liberal international institutions? We argue that liberal international institutions have incentives to appease their democratic critics. Liberal institutions rely on democratic support for their continued effectiveness and can accommodate democratic critics at a lower legitimacy cost than non-democratic challengers. We examine this theory in the context of the European Court of Human Rights using a new dataset of rulings until 2019 and a coding of government positions during multiple reform conferences. Combining matching and a difference-in-differences design, we find strong evidence that the Court exercises restraint towards consolidated democracies that have criticized the Court in multilateral reform conferences by rendering fewer violation judgments against these states. We find some evidence that governments have also recently appointed more deferential judges. The findings suggest that backlash can affect liberal international institutions even without membership exit. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|