Moral responsibility for concepts, continued: Concepts as abstract objects.
In Fredericks (2018b), I argued that we can be morally responsible for our concepts if they are mental representations. Here, I make a complementary argument for the claim that even if concepts are abstract objects, we can be morally responsible for coming to grasp and for thinking (or not thinking)...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 28; no. 4; pp. 1029 - 1044 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2020
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=147642274&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 147642274 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2020 vid: 28 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 147642274 10.1111/ejop.12547 ppf: 1029 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: Moral responsibility for concepts, continued: Concepts as abstract objects. aug: au: Fredericks, Rachel affil: Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Ball State University, Muncie Indiana, su: Responsibility Consequentialism (Ethics) Moral attitudes Ethics Smith, Angela sug: subj: Responsibility Consequentialism (Ethics) Moral attitudes Ethics Smith, Angela ab: In Fredericks (2018b), I argued that we can be morally responsible for our concepts if they are mental representations. Here, I make a complementary argument for the claim that even if concepts are abstract objects, we can be morally responsible for coming to grasp and for thinking (or not thinking) in terms of them. As before, I take for granted Angela Smith's (2005) rational relations account of moral responsibility, though I think the same conclusion follows from various other accounts. My strategy is to focus on the relations that can obtain between concepts (understood as abstract objects) and morally responsible agents. I conclude by discussing some of the reasons why my arguments matter, which have to do with consequential choices between conceptual options, purposefully seeking out concepts that are new to us, and moral education. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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