Instrumental Robots.
Advances in artificial intelligence research allow us to build fairly sophisticated agents: robots and computer programs capable of acting and deciding on their own (in some sense). These systems raise questions about who is responsible when something goes wrong—when such systems harm or kill humans...
| Publicado en: | Science & Engineering Ethics Vol. 26; no. 6; pp. 3121 - 3142 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
2020
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=147734324&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 147734324 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13533452 GNI jtl: Science & Engineering Ethics issn: 13533452 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2020 vid: 26 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 147734324 10.1007/s11948-020-00259-5 ppf: 3121 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 583KB tig: atl: Instrumental Robots. aug: au: Köhler, Sebastian affil: Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, Frankfurt am Main, Germany su: Artificial intelligence Computer software Robots sug: subj: Artificial intelligence Computer software Robots keyword: Agency Human–robot collaboration Instruments Responsibility Responsibility-gaps ab: Advances in artificial intelligence research allow us to build fairly sophisticated agents: robots and computer programs capable of acting and deciding on their own (in some sense). These systems raise questions about who is responsible when something goes wrong—when such systems harm or kill humans. In a recent paper, Sven Nyholm has suggested that, because current AI will likely possess what we might call "supervised agency", the theory of responsibility for individual agency is the wrong place to look for an answer to the question of responsibility. Instead, or so argues Nyholm, because supervised agency is a form of collaborative agency—of acting together—the right place to look is the theory of collaborative responsibility—responsibility in cases of acting together. This paper concedes that current AI will possess supervised agency, but argues that it is nevertheless wrong to think of the relevant human-AI interactions as a form of collaborative agency and, hence, that responsibility in cases of collaborative agency is not the right place to look for the responsibility-grounding relation in human-AI interactions. It also suggests that the right place to look for this responsibility-grounding relation in human-AI interactions is the use of certain sorts of agents as instruments. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Science & Engineering Ethics is a copyright of Springer, 2020. All Rights Reserved. item: Science & Engineering Ethics holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2020 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|