Autonomy and the limits of cognitive enhancement.

In the debates regarding the ethics of human enhancement, proponents have found it difficult to refute the concern, voiced by certain bioconservatives, that cognitive enhancement violates the autonomy of the enhanced. However, G. Owen Schaefer, Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu have attempted not only...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Bioethics Vol. 35; no. 1; pp. 15 - 23
Autor principal: Lewis, Jonathan
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jan2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: Jan2021
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      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
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        10.1111/bioe.12791
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        atl: Autonomy and the limits of cognitive enhancement.
      aug:
        au: Lewis, Jonathan
        affil: Institute of Ethics, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Dublin City University, Dublin, Ireland
      su:
        Autonomy (Psychology)
        Bioethics
        Cognition
        Job performance
        Enhancement medicine
      sug:
        subj:
          Autonomy (Psychology)
          Bioethics
          Cognition
          Job performance
          Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences (except Biotechnology)
          Enhancement medicine
      keyword:
        authenticity
        autonomy
        cognitive enhancement
        competence
        reasoning
        relational autonomy
        authenticity
        autonomy
        cognitive enhancement
        competence
        reasoning
        relational autonomy
      ab: In the debates regarding the ethics of human enhancement, proponents have found it difficult to refute the concern, voiced by certain bioconservatives, that cognitive enhancement violates the autonomy of the enhanced. However, G. Owen Schaefer, Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu have attempted not only to avoid autonomy‐based bioconservative objections, but to argue that cognition‐enhancing biomedical interventions can actually enhance autonomy. In response, this paper has two aims: firstly, to explore the limits of their argument; secondly, and more importantly, to develop a more complete understanding of autonomy and its relation to cognitive enhancement. By drawing a distinction between the capacity for autonomy and the exercise and achievement of autonomy, and by exploring the possible effects of cognitive enhancement on both competence and authenticity conditions for autonomy, the paper identifies and explains which dimensions of autonomy can and cannot, in principle, be enhanced via direct cognitive interventions. This allows us to draw conclusions regarding the limits of cognitive enhancement as a means for enhancing autonomy.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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