Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: On Exogenous Competition, Social Incidence, and Price Discrimination.

Weyl and Fabinger (2013) analyze the social incidence of competition and the output and welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by considering the hypothetical entrance of exogenous quantity into a market. The formulas they use for this purpose, however, are correct only for marginal ch...

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Publicado en:Journal of Political Economy Vol. 129; no. 1; pp. 323 - 336
Autores principales: Miklós-Thal, Jeanine, Shaffer, Greg
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: University of Chicago Press Jan2021
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: On Exogenous Competition, Social Incidence, and Price Discrimination.
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          Miklós-Thal, Jeanine
          Shaffer, Greg
        affil: University of Rochester
      su:
        Monopolies
        Oligopolies
        Price discrimination
        Demand function
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        subj:
          Monopolies
          Oligopolies
          Price discrimination
          Demand function
      ab: Weyl and Fabinger (2013) analyze the social incidence of competition and the output and welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by considering the hypothetical entrance of exogenous quantity into a market. The formulas they use for this purpose, however, are correct only for marginal changes in exogenous quantity starting at zero or if demand functions are linear. We show how using the correct formulas changes Weyl and Fabinger's analyses and leads to new results on the social incidence of competition and on the output and welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in monopoly and oligopoly markets.
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    language: English
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