A Buck-Passing Account of 'Moral Equality'.
The belief that all human beings are 'moral equals' is widespread within the canon of Western liberal philosophy. However, it is unclear precisely what 'moral equality' or its associate terms mean, what grounds our 'moral equality' and what the implications of being 'moral equals' are. In this paper...
| Publicado en: | Res Publica (13564765) Vol. 27; no. 1; pp. 25 - 41 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
2021
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=148427080&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 148427080 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13564765 NMV jtl: Res Publica (13564765) issn: 13564765 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2021 vid: 27 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 148427080 10.1007/s11158-020-09458-0 ppf: 25 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 468KB tig: atl: A Buck-Passing Account of 'Moral Equality'. aug: au: Yim, Elaine Lok-Lam affil: Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong su: Equality Ethics Human beings Conduct of life Philosophy sug: subj: Equality Ethics Human beings Conduct of life Philosophy keyword: Buck-passing account of value Egalitarianism Moral equality Moral status Moral worth ab: The belief that all human beings are 'moral equals' is widespread within the canon of Western liberal philosophy. However, it is unclear precisely what 'moral equality' or its associate terms mean, what grounds our 'moral equality' and what the implications of being 'moral equals' are. In this paper, I distinguish between three ways of understanding 'moral equality': the 'buck-passing', 'explanatory' and 'reverse-explanatory' accounts. The buck-passing account of moral equality is in parallel with Scanlon's buck-passing account of value. It holds that 'moral equality' is not a metaphysically fundamental concept and simply amounts to having other properties shared equally by all human beings that constitute the reasons for why we ought to treat all human beings equally in certain respects. The explanatory account understands the concept of 'moral equality' as metaphysically fundamental and explanatory of why human beings who are the same in certain respects have the same entitlement to x. The reverse-explanatory account also sees 'moral equality' as metaphysically fundamental but holds that the explanatory relationship goes the other way round: moral equality is explained by how we ought to act. I argue that the buck-passing account is a more accurate way of understanding moral equality. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Res Publica (13564765) is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Res Publica (13564765) holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|