God's place in the world.
Lewisian theism is the view that both traditional theism and Lewis's modal realism are true. On Lewisian theism, God must exist in worlds in one of the following ways: (1) God can be said to have a counterpart in each world; (2) God can be said to exist in each world in the way that a universal can...
| Publicado en: | International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol. 89; no. 1; pp. 43 - 66 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=148539731&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 148539731 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00207047 IPH jtl: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion issn: 00207047 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2021 vid: 89 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 148539731 10.1007/s11153-020-09764-w ppf: 43 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 581KB tig: atl: God's place in the world. aug: au: Collier, Matthew James affil: Oriel College, Oriel Square, OX1 4EW, Oxford, UK su: Theism Theology Realism Gods Religious fundamentalism sug: subj: Theism Theology Realism Gods Religious fundamentalism keyword: Modal realism Modality Possible worlds ab: Lewisian theism is the view that both traditional theism and Lewis's modal realism are true. On Lewisian theism, God must exist in worlds in one of the following ways: (1) God can be said to have a counterpart in each world; (2) God can be said to exist in each world in the way that a universal can be said to exist in worlds (if universals exist), i.e. through transworld identity; (3) God can be said to be a scattered individual, with a part of God existing in each world; and, (4) God can be said to exist in each world, through His existing from the standpoint of each world. In the literature, (1)–(4) have been rejected as viable options. I grant that (1) and (3) are not viable. However, I believe that (2) and (4) have been too hastily rejected. Herein, I develop ways to respond to objections to (2) and (4), and conclude that (4) is a viable option for Lewisian theists. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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