Behavioral Foundations for Expression Meaning.
According to a well-established tradition in the philosophy of language, we can understand what makes an arbitrary sound, gesture, or marking into a meaningful linguistic expression only by appealing to mental states, such as beliefs and intentions. In this paper, I explore the contrasting possibili...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 40; no. 1; pp. 27 - 43 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=148539813&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 148539813 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2021 vid: 40 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 148539813 10.1007/s11245-019-09675-0 ppf: 27 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 640KB tig: atl: Behavioral Foundations for Expression Meaning. aug: au: Stotts, Megan Henricks affil: Department of Philosophy, McMaster University, University Hall 310A, 1280 Main Street West, L8S 4K1, Hamilton, ON, Canada su: Tradition (Philosophy) Philosophy of language Pointing (Gesture) Behavior Possibility Gesture sug: subj: Tradition (Philosophy) Philosophy of language Pointing (Gesture) Behavior Possibility Gesture keyword: Foundational theory of meaning Linguistic behavior Linguistic meaning Metasemantics ab: According to a well-established tradition in the philosophy of language, we can understand what makes an arbitrary sound, gesture, or marking into a meaningful linguistic expression only by appealing to mental states, such as beliefs and intentions. In this paper, I explore the contrasting possibility of understanding the meaningfulness of linguistic expressions just in terms of observable linguistic behavior. Specifically, I explore the view that a type of sound (or other item) becomes a meaningful linguistic expression within a group in virtue of the production of that type of item becoming that group's widespread, copied way of getting others to involve an object or relation in their activity. After discussing a preliminary version of the view, I develop it in response to some key concerns about whether it really does, as a matter of fact, eschew mental states, and about its adequacy as an account of linguistic meaning. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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