Temporal B-Coming: Passage without Presentness.
It is taken as obvious that there is a conflict between objective temporal passage and relativistic physics. The traditional formulation of temporal passage is the movement of a universe-wide set of simultaneous events known as the NOW; the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) implies that there is no...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 99; no. 1; pp. 130 - 148 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=148627134&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 148627134 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2021 vid: 99 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 148627134 10.1080/00048402.2020.1744673 ppf: 130 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.4MB tig: atl: Temporal B-Coming: Passage without Presentness. aug: au: Leininger, Lisa affil: Hobart and William Smith Colleges su: Philosophy of time Relativity (Physics) Metaphysics Subjectivity Virtue sug: subj: Philosophy of time Relativity (Physics) Metaphysics Subjectivity Virtue keyword: B-theory temporal becoming temporal passage time ab: It is taken as obvious that there is a conflict between objective temporal passage and relativistic physics. The traditional formulation of temporal passage is the movement of a universe-wide set of simultaneous events known as the NOW; the Special Theory of Relativity (STR) implies that there is no NOW and therefore no temporal passage. The vast majority of those who accept the B-theory blockworld—the metaphysics of time most friendly to relativistic physics—deny that time passes. I argue that this denial is a mistake. Contrary to overwhelmingly popular opinion, temporal passage does not need a NOW. To show this, I defend a relational understanding of temporal becoming, that I call B-coming, in which an event y B-comes with respect to x iff Rxy. Temporal passage is then the difference in what has B-come at one point in a thing's history with respect to what has B-come at an earlier point in that thing's history. Appealing to this kind of relation is a strategy that is well-known but has been widely dismissed. This dismissal is premature; I show that the essential elements of temporal passage do not necessarily require a NOW. There can be passage without presentness. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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