Defending Intrinsic Biological Essentialism.
In "Resurrecting Biological Essentialism," I went against the consensus in the philosophy of biology by arguing that a Linnaean taxon, including a species, has an essence that is, at least partly, an underlying intrinsic, mostly genetic, property: this intrinsic nature explains both the truth of gen...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 88; no. 1; pp. 67 - 83 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | In "Resurrecting Biological Essentialism," I went against the consensus in the philosophy of biology by arguing that a Linnaean taxon, including a species, has an essence that is, at least partly, an underlying intrinsic, mostly genetic, property: this intrinsic nature explains both the truth of generalizations about the phenotypic properties of the taxon and why being in the taxon is explanatory. The current article is a response to two criticisms: that this intrinsic essentialism is at odds with certain biological variations and that this talk of intrinsic essences is an uncalled for metaphysical addition to biology. |
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