Cognitive Models Are Distinguished by Content, Not Format.
Cognitive scientists often describe the mind as constructing and using models of aspects of the environment, but it is not obvious what makes something a model as opposed to a mere representation. The leading proposal among philosophers is that models are structural representations and are therefore...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 88; no. 1; pp. 83 - 103 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
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