Political Realism and Political Reasons.

Some people, we may call them realists, endorse the priority thesis. This thesis says political reasons (distinct from moral, prudential, aesthetic, economic, and other kinds of reason) have normative priority whenever we assess political situations. Any putative political reasons, I argue, must sat...

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Published in:Social Theory & Practice Vol. 47; no. 1; pp. 91 - 125
Main Author: Kiss, Sam
Format: Article
Published: Florida State University Jan2021
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        Ethics
        Political realism
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          Political realism
          Political philosophy
          Critical realism
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        methods
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      ab: Some people, we may call them realists, endorse the priority thesis. This thesis says political reasons (distinct from moral, prudential, aesthetic, economic, and other kinds of reason) have normative priority whenever we assess political situations. Any putative political reasons, I argue, must satisfy an autonomy condition and an identity condition. I argue that no realist account of political reasons shows such reasons are distinct and autonomous as of yet. One account, the practice-based account, may have the wherewithal to show political reasons are distinct. I also say some things about the relations between identity, autonomy, and priority.
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