Privileged Groups and Obligation: Engineering Bad Concepts.

Assuming that there is an obligation to combat structural injustice, what does it look like? I suggest that discerning what this obligation is, and on whom it falls, first requires being sensitive to facts about social structure. Importantly, we need to know how social structure is constituted, and...

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Publicado en:Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 38; no. 1; pp. 7 - 23
Autor principal: Podosky, Paul‐Mikhail Catapang
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Feb2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Privileged Groups and Obligation: Engineering Bad Concepts.
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        au: Podosky, Paul‐Mikhail Catapang
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University Of Melbourne, Parkville VIC, 3010, , Australia
      su:
        Responsibility
        Social groups
        Social structure
        Social facts
        Concepts
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          Responsibility
          Social groups
          Social structure
          Social facts
          Concepts
      ab: Assuming that there is an obligation to combat structural injustice, what does it look like? I suggest that discerning what this obligation is, and on whom it falls, first requires being sensitive to facts about social structure. Importantly, we need to know how social structure is constituted, and the ways in which it can be disrupted. I argue that since social structure is constituted, in part, by concepts that undergird social practices, then our critical attention should be focused on those concepts that undergird oppressive social practices. In the end, I suggest that the obligation to combat structural injustice falls on privileged social groups to significantly aid in the processes that give rise to conceptual change.
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