Intuition, Revelation, and Relativism.
This paper defends the view that philosophical propositions are merely relatively true, i.e. true relative to a doxastic perspective defined at least in part by a non-inferential belief-acquiring method. Here is the strategy: first, the primary way that contemporary philosophers defend their views i...
| Publicado en: | International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 12; no. 3; pp. 271 - 296 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Sep2004
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=14873622&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 14873622 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09672559 5BE jtl: International Journal of Philosophical Studies issn: 09672559 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2004 vid: 12 iid: 3 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 14873622 10.1080/0967255042000243957 ppf: 271 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.5MB tig: atl: Intuition, Revelation, and Relativism. aug: au: Hales, Steven D. su: Relativity Intuition Revelation Skepticism Belief & doubt Philosophy sug: subj: Relativity Intuition Revelation Skepticism Belief & doubt Philosophy keyword: basic belief foundationalism intuition reflective equilibrium relativism revelation ab: This paper defends the view that philosophical propositions are merely relatively true, i.e. true relative to a doxastic perspective defined at least in part by a non-inferential belief-acquiring method. Here is the strategy: first, the primary way that contemporary philosophers defend their views is through the use of rational intuition, and this method delivers non-inferential, basic beliefs which are then systematized and brought into reflective equilibrium. Second, Christian theologians use exactly the same methodology, only replacing intuition with revelation. Third, intuition and revelation yield frequently inconsistent output beliefs. Fourth, there is no defensible reason to prefer the dictates of intuition to those of Christian revelation. Fifth, the resulting dilemma means that there are true philosophical propositions, but we can't know them (scepticism), or there are no philosophical propositions and the naturalists are right (nihilism), or relativism is true. I suggest that relativism is the most palatable of these alternatives. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of International Journal of Philosophical Studies is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: International Journal of Philosophical Studies holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2004 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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