Derivative deprivation and the wrong of abortion.
In his 'The Identity Objection to the future‐like‐ours argument' (Bioethics, 2019, 33: 287–293), Brill argues that Marquis's 'future of value' account of the wrong of abortion is still vulnerable to the identity objection—the claim that the foetus and the later person are not numerically identical,...
| Publicado en: | Bioethics Vol. 35; no. 3; pp. 277 - 284 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |