Being Sympathetic to Bad‐History Wrongdoers.

For many philosophers, bad‐history wrongdoers are primarily interesting because of what their cases might tell us about the interaction of moral responsibility and history. However, philosophers focusing on blameworthiness have overlooked important questions about blame itself. These bad‐history cas...

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Publicado en:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 102; no. 1; pp. 147 - 170
Autor principal: Agule, Craig K.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Mar2021
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Agule, Craig K.
        affil: Department of Philosophy and Religion, Rutgers University – Camden
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        Responsibility
        Philosophers
        Sympathy
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          Responsibility
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      ab: For many philosophers, bad‐history wrongdoers are primarily interesting because of what their cases might tell us about the interaction of moral responsibility and history. However, philosophers focusing on blameworthiness have overlooked important questions about blame itself. These bad‐history cases are complicated because blame and sympathy are both fitting. When we are careful to consider the rich natures of those two reactions, we see that they conflict in several important ways. We should see bad‐history cases as cases about whether and how we should blame, rather than as cases giving us ready insight into the nature of moral responsibility.
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